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Notes
WHO DECIDES? THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL
OVER THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S
SPENDING POWER*
Consistent with the historical legislative-executive budget rela-
tionship and The Steel Seizure Case, the President has no inherent
constitutional power to not spend appropriated funds. The Im-
poundment Control Act is a clear statutory limitation on
the President's discretion to implement policy impoundments.
Crippled by the Chadha decision which held the legislative veto
unconstitutional and the recent New Haven decision, the Im-
poundment Control Act should be amended to restore the constitu-
tional authority of the Congress to establish national policy
through the budget-making and appropriations process.
The ramifications of the Supreme Court's decision in INS v.
Chadha t four years ago continue to plague the relationship between
the executive and legislative branches as well as to occupy the atten-
tion of both courts and commentators. The principal issues have
been the constitutionality of a variety of legislative veto provisions
attached to some 250 separate statutes, and the extent to which the
offending provisions can be excised from existing law without void-
ing the entire statute.a
Commentary immediately following Chadha and the demise of
* The author would like to thank Professors Chisolm, Durchslag and Leatherberry for
their helpful criticism during the preparation of this Note.
1. 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (legislative veto device held to be an unconstitutional exercise of
congressional power since it lacks approval by both Houses of Congress and presentment to
the President).
2. The issue remaining after Chadha was establishing a severability standard to apply
to the statutes with unconstitutional legislative veto provisions. The Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Alaska Airlines v. Donovan, 766 F.2d 1550 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 1476
(1987) affirmed the standard presuming viability of the statute, minus the unconstitutional
veto, if what remains is an operative law. To defeat severability, the party arguing against
severability must show that Congress would not have enacted the statute without the legisla-
tive veto provision.
Our charge is to save as much of the statute as we can, consistent of course with
the underlying legislative intent. Only if we conclude that Congress would not have
included a provision absent the constitutionally flawed portion is that provision to
fall. The issue cannot be whether Congress preferred the statute with the unconsti-
tutional provision over the same statute without that provision.
Id. at 1560.
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the legislative veto was extensive.3 It generally foretold of a shift in
the structural power relationship between the Congress and the
President. In the 98th Congress, bills were introduced to provide
for a constitutional amendment affirming the validity of a legislative
veto mechanism as a legitimate legislative tool.' Congress had used
the legislative veto to ensure proper implementation of laws by the
executive acting through its extensive administrative agency system.
These bills, however, ultimately languished in the various commit-
tees. Instead, the Congress responded to the Supreme Court's pro-
nouncement with a variety of alternative legislative mechanisms-
fully constitutional- which formalize the working relationship be-
tween Congress and the President and limit the discretionary pow-
ers which had been gradually afforded to the President.'
The focus of this Note is the effect of Chadha on the Impound-
ment Control Act6 which is Title X of the Congressional Budget
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 ("Budget Act").7  The
Budget Act extensively reformed the legislative budget process in an
attempt by Congress to wrest control over spending allocations
from the executive. The imposition of impoundment control
stemmed in large measure from Congress' inability to contain a
strong President's revision of statutory priorities regarding the
spending of appropriated funds. The mechanism ultimately agreed
to by both the President and Congress was a political accommoda-
tion which conveyed to the President the discretion to propose
spending changes after enactment of appropriations bills.8 In addi-
3. For an extensive listing of this commentary see Note, The Aftermath of Chadha"
The Impact of the Severability Doctrine on the Management of Intragovernmental Relations,
71 VA. L. REv. 1211, 1211 n.2 (1985). See also Stewart, Constitutionality of the Legislative
Veto, 13 HARV. 3. ON LEGIs. 593, 593 n.I (1976) for a listing of pre-Chadha commentary on
the legislative veto.
4. See DeConcini & Faucher, The Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Amendment, 21
HARV. J. ON LEGiS. 29 (1984) (a discussion supporting the legislative veto amendment, and
Senator DeConcini's resolution S.J. Res. 135 to that effect).
5. For a thorough discussion of the various legislative devices the Congress now em-
ploys to effect oversight of the agencies and to keep within the constitutional boundaries of
Chadha, see Fisher, Judicial Misjudgments About the Lawmaking Process: The Legislative
Veto Case, 45 PUB. ADMIN. RV. 705 (Nov. 1985) [hereinafter Judicial Misjudgments]. See
also Kaiser, Congressional Control of Executive Actions in the Aftermath of the Chadha Deci-
sion, 36 ADMIN. L. REv. 239 (1984).
6. Impoundment Control Act, Pub. L. No. 93-344, Title X §§ 1001-1017, 88 Stat. 297,
332-339, 2 U.S.C. §§ 681-688 (1982) [hereinafter ICA].
7. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344,
88 Stat. 297-339 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. (1982 and Supp. IV
1986)) [hereinafter Budget Act].
8. President Nixon signed the bill into public law on July 12, 1974, although this em-
bodied the very constraint on executive powers his administration had protested. In the wake
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tion, the Impoundment Control Act reserved to the Congress the
right to review and negate or approve these executive
recommendations. 9
The effect of Chadha was to upset this political accommodation
by voiding the one-House legislative veto for disapproval of pro-
posed delays in spending-the deferral provision of the Impound-
ment Control Act. 10 In 1986 the Reagan Administration pushed
for judicial resolution of the deferral provision's constitutionality,
and argued for excising only the legislative veto provision.11 The
House responded to this by passing legislation to delete the deferral
provision entirely from the Impoundment Control Act, only to have
the proposal dropped by the Republican-controlled Senate.12 Early
in 1987, the President announced his intention to recommend re-
forms in the congressional budget process, including revision of im-
poundment control.13 By summer, the reform discussions between
Congress and the White House had stalled. In light of the back-
ground of strained relations over spending delays, the change to a
Democratically-controlled Senate and the government's defeat in
the courts, the prospects for any further change in impoundment
procedures during the Reagan Administration are not bright.14
of court decisions against the government on impoundment, President Nixon ultimately con-
ceded the issue.
9. See infra notes 42-63 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 64-84 and accompanying text.
11. See City of New Haven v. United States, 634 F. Supp. 1449 (D.D.C. 1986). A three-
judge panel for the District Court of the District of Columbia ruled that the entire deferral
provision, section 1013, and the legislative veto provision were severable. On January 20,
1987, this decision was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, 809 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1987). See infra notes 96-116 and accompanying text.
12. The House proposal was attached as a rider to the Urgent Supplemental Appropria-
tions Bill, Pub. L. No. 99-349, 100 Stat. 710 (1986). For a closer examination of the deferral
debate see 44 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 678 (Mar. 22, 1986); 792 (Apr. 12, 1986); 1066 (May
10, 1986); 1133 (May 17, 1986); 1249 (May 23, 1986); 1364 (June 14, 1986); 1422 (June 21,
1986).
13. With the departure of Donald Regan as President Reagan's Chief of Staff in early
March 1987, the early executive impetus for budget reform proposals disappeared. See The
Cleveland Plain Dealer, Mar. 7, 1987, at 4-A, col. 1.
During July 1987 Congress and the administration joined in budget conferences con-
cerned with the entire budget and appropriations process. President Reagan publicly called
for support for budget reform, including "enhanced rescission authority" contained in a
budget reform bill introduced by Senator Pete V. Domenici (R-N.M.). See The Cleveland
Plain Dealer, Mar. 22, 1987, at 8-A, col. 1. Domenici's proposal, which looks much like a
line-item veto authority, allows the President to rescind funds from appropriations unless the
Congress objects within a specific period. See S. 832, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., Title 11 (1987).
It is not likely to be adopted.
14. See 44 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 3139 (Dec. 27, 1986) for analysis. With these polit-
ical changes and the revelations from the congressional hearings on the Iran-Contra-gate
[Vol. 38:66
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This Note will argue that the President has no inherent constitu-
tional power to not spend appropriated funds. To the extent to
which the President has had discretion to withhold funds, that dis-
cretion has historically been a matter of political accommodation
between the Congress and the President. It is not properly an issue
for the courts.
The constitutional power to authorize programs and to appro-
priate funds to carry out those programs rests with Congress. 15 The
essence of the legislative process is making policy: balancing com-
peting interests, seeking a consensus and enacting programs to carry
out those policies. The President's constitutional role in the legisla-
tive process is strictly limited to proposing legislation and using the
veto as a check on Congress' power. The executive's primary role is
to carry out legislative programs and policies, that is, to faithfully
execute the laws.16 In reality today, the President's power and in-
fluence in the legislative process is considerably broader, in part due
to the singularly powerful position of the President as a national
political leader and also in part due to the gradual accrual of power
in the executive both by design and by default.' 7 Thus the combina-
tion of constitutional power and historically accumulated power has
contributed to the President's major policy-making role.
Yet this breadth of power is not limitless. Policy-making as a
purely legislative function requires that funds to implement policy
may not be spent except in consequence of enacted legislation.
Likewise, not spending appropriated money for policy reasons is
policy-making and not a presidential prerogative. The institutional
tensions which are by design an important feature of our constitu-
tional system were conceived by the Framers as a check on abuse of
power by any one branch of government.18 The system was not
designed for efficiency or speed but rather to insure fundamental
freedoms through a government of laws. Although these institu-
arms scandal, the President, with less than one year remaining in his term, has little leverage
to negotiate with the Congress on this issue. The deferral issue is only part of a whole range
of major budget disputes focused on the deficit, Gramm-Rudman reform, the debt ceiling,
and all the appropriations bills for fiscal year 1988. See 45 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1369-73
(June 27, 1987).
15. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; § 9, cl. 7.
16. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
17. See infra notes 124-62 and accompanying text.
18. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (J. Madison)(C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Madison
wrote that:
[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same
hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.
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tional tensions are always present, the executive and legislative
branches act most in harmony when the two share the same polit-
ical and philosophical objectives. When there is a split government,
as with a Republican President and a Democratically-controlled
Congress, the differing policy objectives of the two branches will
result in a high level of tension and disharmony. This strain ex-
poses the weaknesses of the political process, which happened dur-
ing the Nixon presidency over impoundments, 19 as the more
efficient political branch enhances its control over the process. The
reaction by Congress to the shift in political power becomes more
cohesive as an institutional reaction when the taking of control is
too great or is an abuse of power.
The personalities in office define the dynamics of the system.
No political structure can effectively contain this institutional ten-
sion. Periods of greatest policy conflict will foster more creative
ways to circumvent the system in order to achieve certain policy
objectives. In 1974 Congress reacted to Nixon's impoundment poli-
cies with legislation designed to severely curtail presidential im-
poundments.2 0 Then increasing use of the legislative veto device to
control executive agencies led in 1983 to the Chadha decision de-
claring the legislative veto unconstitutional.21 Taking advantage of
a crippled deferral process, the Reagan Administration sought ways
to expand its impoundment authority, ultimately seeking unsuccess-
fully to gut the basic purpose of the 1974 ICA. 2 Left with a greatly
restricted deferral authority, the administration has tried to negoti-
ate with Congress for new impoundment authority. 3
This Note will examine the inherent power theory of impound-
ment and the historical political relationship between the President
and Congress relating to the appropriations power and process in
order to better address the problems with the current impoundment
control process. Part I of this Note will survey the history behind
enactment of the Impoundment Control Act and examine the
19. See Congress Given New Budget Controls, CONGRESS AND THE NATION 1973-76,
Vol. IV, 71-73 (1977).
20. See infra notes 42-63 and accompanying text.
21. 462 U.S. at 959.
22. See President's DeferralAuthority, XLII CONG. Q. ALMANAC 576-78 (1986); Budget
Process: Reconciling Spending, Taxes, CONGRESS AND THE NATION, 1981-84, Vol. VI, 34
(1985).
23. In his fiscal year 1988 Budget Message, President Reagan called for reform of the
budget process, to include presidential line-item veto authority. 45 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP.
81 (Jan. 10, 1987). The line-item veto was featured in Reagan's "Economic Bill of Rights"
speech, see id. at 1532 (July 11, 1987), and again in his 1988 State of the Union message, 46
CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 190 (Jan. 30, 1988).
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mechanisms established to control impoundment. Part II will ad-
dress the impact of the Chadha decision on the Impoundment Con-
trol Act and the current situation after City of New Haven v. United
States.24 Part III will evaluate competing claims to spending power
by both the Congress and the President. It will also explore histori-
cal political accommodations through which the President and the
Congress have established a shared power in the budget process.
Part IV will examine the constitutional issue of whether the execu-
tive has inherent power to impound, building on The Steel Seizure
Case25 and enactment of the Impoundment Control Act. Part V
will conclude with an evaluation of the current impoundment con-
trol process and the defects which have been exposed and examine
proposals for reform.
I. HISTORY BEHIND IMPOUNDMENT
Impoundment in its modem fiscal context refers to the unlawful
withholding of monies already appropriated 6.2  "Impoundment in
its broadest sense includes any type of Executive action which effec-
tively precludes the obligation or expenditure of any part of budget
authority. It does not include presidential action which is in strict
compliance with discretion vested in the executive branch by the
Congress. "27 Money can alternatively be withheld through
reprogramming of funds within a budget account, 8 or by transfer
24. 809 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
25. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
26. For extensive historical background, see Abascal & Kramer, Presidential Impound-
ment Part L Historical Genesis and Constitutional Framework, 62 GEO. L.J 1549 (1974)
[hereinafter Abascal & Kramer I].
27. Mikva & Hertz, Impoundment of Funds - The Courts, the Congress and the Presi-
dent: A Constitutional Triangle, 69 NW. U.L. Rav. 335, 337 (1974) (footnote omitted) [here-
inafter Mikva & Hertz]. "Rescissions" and "deferrals" are statutorily permissible methods
for the President to propose withholding and are technically not impoundments. However,
the term "impoundments" will be used in this discussion to describe withholding of funds,
whether deferrals or rescissions.
The term "budget authority" is used as defined in the Budget Act, 2 U.S.C. § 622(2):
"The term 'budget authority' means authority provided by law to enter into obligations
which will result in immediate or future outlays involving Government funds or to collect
offsetting receipts, except that such term does not include authority to insure or guarantee the
repayment of indebtedness incurred by another person or government."
28. Reprogramming is not impoundment. It is a procedure whereby executive officials
can shift funds within a budget account from one program to another. It can result from
wage-rate adjustments, unforeseen developments, inaccurate pricing, etc. Reprogramming is
an informal, nonbinding process between the agency and its congressional appropriations
committees to resolve any disputes about shifting funds. For further discussion on
reprogramming activities, see L. FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 75-98 (1975).
[hereinafter L. FISHER].
1987)
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of funds from one account to another due to program reevaluations,
revisions, cancellation or by subsequent enactment of legislation.29
Impoundment actions can either delay spending or simply propose
not to spend at all, thereby suspending or even cancelling all or part
of a program. 30 The use of regulations or paperwork can slow the
process of expending funds and effect an overall decrease in the
spending level for the fiscal year. Some impoundments can be clas-
sified as routine managerial actions, for instance, savings due to
lower costs than projected. However, many impoundments en-
croach on Congress' constitutional authority to determine policy
and budget priorities31 - as in the refusal to implement a program
or protracted delays in spending for a program with which the Pres-
ident disagrees.
A. The Historical Framework
Impoundment has been a part of our political process ever since
President Jefferson refused to spend $50,000 appropriated to build a
warship, claiming it was no longer needed.32 Although successor
presidents withheld spending appropriated funds for policy rea-
sons, 33 the practice was not extensive. The modem impoundment
era began with President Franklin Roosevelt, who impounded
funds from certain domestic programs to ensure adequate emer-
gency funding for the Second World War and national defense.3 4
Although there was a struggle between Congress and the President
over deferring domestic expenditures, "Congress statutorily author-
ized many of the deferrals and expressly recognized the higher pri-
ority of military mobilization."3 Presidents until the early 1970s
have withheld appropriated monies in varying amounts, principally
for military spending proposals.36 A kind of gentlemen's agreement
29. Transfer authority applies to shifting of funds from one budget account to another.
The authority to transfer is provided explicitly in the legislation. See also L. FISHER, supra
note 28, at 99-122.
30. Fisher identifies four basic types of impoundment actions: 1) routine management
decisions for efficiency reasons; 2) statutory authority; 3) constitutional power; and 4) admin-
istrative policy-making. See id. at 148-74 (for a full discussion).
31. Id. at 148.
32. Mikva & Hertz, supra note 27, at 341. The money was later spent when changed
international conditions required an increase in naval forces.
33. Id. at 341, n.27.
34. Id. at 341.
35. Abascal & Kramer I, supra note 26, at 1604 (footnote omitted).
36. See id. at 1611-12 for a discussion of President Truman's refusal to comply with
Congress' approval of a larger Air Force than the President wanted. See also Mikva & Hertz,
supra note 27, at 342-43 (Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy withheld money targeted for
[Vol. 38:66
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between the two branches assured limited executive discretion to
expend public monies wisely and economically while not thwarting
the basic budget policies enacted by Congress.37
However, under President Nixon, this agreement was breached
as impoundments reached unprecedented levels and directly
targeted domestic programs the President wanted to cut.38 Nixon's
actions spawned a series of lawsuits-most of which held the Presi-
dent's actions illegal 39 -and ultimately led to enactment of the Con-
gressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.4 The
Impoundment Control Act of the Budget Act, Title X, worked well
until President Reagan began to assert broad control powers over
federal spending, particularly in 1986.41
B. The Impoundment Control Act of 1974
In the wake of public outcries and substantial litigation, the
Congress moved in the early 1970s to enact a comprehensive budget
reform measure and to reassert its central role of policy-making in
certain weapons programs, while President Johnson, like Roosevelt, reduced spending in cer-
tain domestic programs). See also Note, Addressing the Resurgence of Presidential
Budgetmaking Initiative A Proposal to Reform the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 63
TEX. L. REv. 693, 695-96, nn. 12-14 (1985).
37. Impoundment of Appropriated Funds by the President Joint Hearings on S. 373
before the Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Impoundment of Funds of the Senate Comm. on Government
Operations and the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
93d Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1973) (statement of Senator Ervin) [hereinafter 1973 Hearings]; Mikva
& Hertz, supra note 27, at 363-64 n.134. Senator Ervin recognized the need for limited im-
poundments which "when undertaken pursuant to congressional dictate ... may be quite
useful in effecting economy." 1973 Hearings, supra, at 2. See L. FISHER, THE POLITICS OF
SHARED POWER 85-86 (1981).
38. See L. FISHER, supra note 28, at 171-74 for a discussion of the Nixon impound-
ments. See also Mikva & Hertz, supra note 27, at 343-44.
For testimony and questioning of Deputy Attorney General Joseph Sneed, see 1973 Hear-
ing, supra note 37, at 358-402.
39. Of the more than 50 cases litigated during this period, only four decisions sustained
the President's position. For a list of the Nixon impoundment cases, see Court Challenges to
Executive Branch Impoundments of Appropriated Funds: Special Report of the Joint Comm.
on Congressional Operations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) and Presidential Impoundment of
Congressionally Appropriated Funds: An Analysis of Recent Federal Court Decisions, House
Comm. on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
40. L. FISHER, COURT CASES ON IMPOUNDMENT OF FUNDS: A PUBLIC POLICY
ANALYSIS (1974) [hereinafter COURT CASES]. The Nixon impoundment cases were decided
on the basis of statutory construction: whether the statutory language was mandatory or
discretionary as regards the executive spending authority. Those federal courts which consid-
ered the issue dismissed the government's inherent power argument, but the decision did not
rest on this finding. See also Abascal & Kramer, Presidential Impoundment Part I1: Judicial
and Legislative Responses, 63 GEO. L.J. 149 (1974) [hereinafter Abascal & Kramer II];
Mikva & Hertz, supra note 27, at 346-62.
41. See 44 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 737-38 (Apr. 5, 1986); 2915 (Nov. 15, 1986).
1987]
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fiscal matters.42 The Budget Act declared as Congress' central
purpose:
(1) to assure effective congressional control over the budget-
ary process;
(2) to provide for the congressional determination each year
of the appropriate level of Federal revenues and expenditures;
(3) to provide a system of impoundment control;
(4) to establish national budget priorities; and
(5) to provide for the furnishing of information by the exec-
utive branch in a manner that will assist the Congress in dis-
charging its duties. 43
Title X is the Impoundment Control Act.' It contains a disclaimer
that "Nothing contained in this Act, or in any amendments made
by this Act, shall be construed as -
(1) asserting or conceding the constitutional powers or limita-
tions of either the Congress or the President."45
The procedures established by the Impoundment Control Act
make clear that Congress is reasserting its control in the appropria-
tions and spending arena. The Impoundment Control Act amended
the 1950 Anti-Deficiency Act by deleting the "other developments"
language to narrowly circumscribe executive authority to establish
reserves only for contingencies, to effect savings through efficiencies,
or as provided by law.46
The Impoundment Control Act identifies two categories of im-
poundment: deferrals and rescissions. Deferrals are generally tem-
porary delays in spending money within the current fiscal year and
are presumed to be routine managerial decisions rather than policy
decisions.47 Rescissions are proposals not to spend for all or part of
a program. Deferral of budget authority includes in its definition,
(A) withholding or delaying the obligation or expenditure
or budget authority (whether by establishing reserves or other-
wise) provided for projects or activities; or
(B) any other type of Executive action or inaction which ef-
42. See generally CONGRESS AND THE NATION, 1973-76, supra note 19.
43. 2 U.S.C. § 621 (Congressional Declaration of Purpose).
44. ICA, supra note 6.
45. Id. § 1001.
46. Id. § 1002. See infra notes 146-48 and accompanying text. This section deleted the
"other developments" language which President Nixon relied on to impound funds and re-
quires that reserves established under authority of the Anti-Deficiency Act be reported as
provided for in the Impoundment Control Act.
47. Following the New Haven decision the deferral provision of the ICA, section 1013, is
invalid. The ICA has not been amended since New Haven. See City of New Haven v. United
States, 634 F. Supp. 1449 (D.D.C. 1986) aff'd, 809 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
[Vol. 38:66
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fectively precludes the obligation or expenditure of budget author-
ity, including authority to obligate by contract in advance of
appropriations as specifically authorized by law.48
Funds deferred beyond the end of a fiscal year, or budget authority
that expires if funds are deferred, are not classified as deferrals.
This category is presumed to include temporary delays made for
managerial reasons rather than for strictly policy reasons, although
the provision clearly allows the President to report policy deferrals.
The funds are immediately withheld when the deferral message is
sent to Congress. The burden is placed on Congress to disapprove
the deferral and reinstate the obligation to spend. There is no time
limit within which the Congress must act.
The other category of impoundment is a rescission,49 which in-
cludes all other proposals to not spend in whole or in part for any
program as provided in the budget authority. A deferral in spend-
ing for the final year of a multi-year appropriation is included in the
rescission category. Also included are determinations by the Presi-
dent that "all or part of any budget authority will not be required to
carry out the full objectives or scope of programs for which it is
provided."5 A rescission includes withheld funds that are neces-
sary to fulfill the objectives of the appropriation-and generally in-
cludes "policy" impoundments.51 The President bears the burden
to gain congressional approval.
For any rescission, the President is required to transmit a special
message to both the General Accounting Office ("GAO") and the
Congress, detailing the amount to be rescinded, the reasons why,
the estimated fiscal, economic and budgetary effect of the rescission,
and additional facts or considerations bearing on the decision.5"
The Congress has 45 legislative days from receipt of the rescission
in which to approve the proposed rescission or it does not take ef-
fect.53 The funds proposed for rescission are not available for obli-
gation during this 45-legislative day period.54
48. ICA, § 1011(1) (emphasis added).
49. Id. § 1012. See discussion in Abascal & Kramer II, supra note 40, at 181-82.
50. ICA, § 1012(a).
51. Policy impoundments may be described as a legislative act: a decision not to fund a
program in whole or in part because the President has a political agenda different from that of
Congress. The D.C. Circuit in New Haven described a policy deferral as one "ordinarily
intended to negate the will of Congress by substituting the fiscal policies of the Executive
Branch for those established by the enactment of budget legislation." 809 F.2d at 901.
52. ICA, § 1012, § 1014(a)-(b).
53. Id. § 1011(3).
54. Section 1012(b) states:
Any amount of budget authority proposed to be rescinded or that is to be reserved
1987]
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Proposed deferrals similarly require transmittal of a special
message from the President including the detailed explanatory
statements listed above.55 However, deferrals cannot be proposed
beyond the end of the current fiscal year.5 6  The deferred funds
must be made available for obligation or a new deferral message
sent. The deferral takes effect automatically unless either the House
or the Senate disapproves of the proposed deferral. 7 The procedure
for disapproving deferrals is the so-called legislative veto which
Chadha has found unconstitutional in any form. 8
The General Accounting Office plays several roles in this pro-
cess. First, it must evaluate the proposed deferral (or rescission) to
determine that it is accurately categorized.5 9  If a deferral is incor-
rectly labeled, the GAO then reports the proper designation (a re-
scission) to the House and the Senate, and the 45-legislative day
period begins at that later reporting date.6 0 The GAO also has au-
as set forth in such special message shall be made available for obligation unless,
within the prescribed 45-day period, the Congress has completed action on a rescis-
sion bill rescinding all or part of the amount proposed to be rescinded or that is to
be reserved.
However, the GAO has determined that the President may withhold spending pending action
on the rescission or until the expiration of the 45-day limit. See The Economy and Fiscal
Policy 1974: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Budget, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 376 (1974)
(letter of Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General of the United States, to Senator Edmund S.
Muskie, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Budget dated Dec. 18, 1974). See also Oversight on
the Impoundment Control Process, Hearing Before the Task Force on Enforcement, Credit and
Multiyear Budgeting of the House Comm. on the Budget, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1982)
[hereinafter Impoundment Oversight Hearing]. See also Appellant's Brief at 6, City of New
Haven v. United States, 809 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
55. ICA, § 1013.
56. Id § 1013(a).
57. Id. § 1013(b). The GAO has held that a reimpounding of funds after disapproval of
the initial deferral by the Congress is not legal. This redeferral technique was used to con-
tinue withholding funds for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve in 1985-86. See Defects in the
Deferral Mechanism in the Impoundment Control Act, Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 108-09 (1986) (statement of
Milton J. Socolar, Special Assistant to Comptroller General, GAO) [hereinafter Deferral De-
fects Hearing]. See also Legislative Branch Appropriations for 1987, Hearings Before a Sub-
comm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, Part 2, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 520-23, 532-33
(1986)(report and statements from GAO). OMB Director James Miller does not accept this
position. See The Deferral Process After Chadha, Hearings Before the House Comm. on
Rules, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1986) [hereinafter Deferral Process Hearings].
58. ICA, § 1011(4). Disapproval by either the House or Senate is recorded in an "im-
poundment resolution." Since it is an act by the legislature acting unicamerally and without
presentment to the President, the deferral provision lies within the category determined un-
constitutional under Chadha. See infra notes 64-84 and accompanying text.
59. ICA, § 1015(b).
60. There is no stipulation in the statute as to the procedure for misclassification. The
GAO position is that it informs Congress of its reclassification and that the 45-day clock
begins running with the reclassification date. If at the end of that period the funds are not
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thority to additionally report any deferrals or rescissions it indepen-
dently determines are in effect, and these messages from the GAO
are treated as though they have been received from the President.6
Any special message transmitted as either a deferral or rescission is
printed in the Federal Register for public notice. z In addition, the
GAO's Comptroller General is "expressly empowered.., to bring a
civil action" in the Federal District Court for the District of Colum-
bia should a required budget authority continue to be withheld by
the appropriate executive department or agency.63
II. THE EFFECTS OF Chadha ON THE IMPOUNDMENT
CONTROL ACT
A. The Chadha Decision
On June 23, 1983, the Supreme Court decided that the legisla-
tive veto was unconstitutional." The one-House veto power over
executive acts breached the "carefully crafted restraints''65 imposed
by the constitutional separation of powers. The majority opinion by
Chief Justice Warren Burger focused on the purposes and policies
under the bicameralism66 and presentment67 clauses to argue his
theory.
The bicameralism requirement emphasizes that "legislation
should not be enacted unless it has been carefully and fully consid-
ered by the Nation's elected officials."68 The presentment clause
gives the President a role in the legislative process by providing him
a power to veto proposed legislation as a way of circumscribing
Congress' law-making powers and negating any oppressive or
released, then GAO can bring suit. The administration has disputed this position, asserting
GAO can only notify Congress of its finding. See Deferral Defects Hearing, supra note 57, at
134 (statement of Milton J. Socolar, Special Assistant to the Comptroller General, GAO).
61. ICA, § 1015(a).
62. Id. § 1014(d).
63. Id. § 1016. The suit can be brought 25 calendar days after an explanation has been
filed with the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate. See Abascal & Kramer
II, supra note 40, at 182-84 for an explanation of the judicial procedure.
The authority of the Comptroller General to sue the government was challenged in Staats
v. Lynn, Civ. No. 75-0551 (D.D.C. 1976), but was dropped when release of the disputed
funds mooted the case. With section 1013 invalidated, the Comptroller General now lacks
authority to bring suit if the "required budget authority" which should be obligated is a
deferral.
64. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
65. Id. at 959.
66. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § I; § 7, cl. 2.
67. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3.
68. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 949.
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poorly drafted legislation.69 The intention of the Framers was to
give the President a limited legislative role through the veto.70
Throughout the elaborate tripartite scheme of governmental control
was the keen desire of the Framers to "divide and disperse power in
order to protect liberty. ' 71 Not persuaded by the efficiency 72 or
"political invention"73 arguments, Burger adhered strictly to the
theory of separable functions and duties for each of the three
branches of government. 74 In this regard, Burger's separation the-
ory closely parallels the arguments used by Justice Black in The
Steel Seizure Case.75
Powell's concurrence in Chadha also raised the abuse of power
concerns of the Framers,76 but he expressed deep concern with the
broad impact of the majority's ruling.77 Citing Justice Jackson in
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer,78 Powell's theory of sep-
aration is less stark than Burger's, urging " 'separateness but inter-
dependence, autonomy but reciprocity.' ,79 Violation of the
separation of powers doctrine can be determined in one of two
ways: impermissible interference with the constitutional functions
of a coordinate branch; or assumption of a function which properly
belongs to another branch.80 On the facts of Chadha, Powell con-
69. Id. at 947-48.
70. Id. There are four constitutional provisions which permit a single House to act with
no presidential veto power: 1) art. I, § 2, cl. 5, (House initiated impeachment proceedings);
2) art. I, § 3, cl. 6, (Senate impeachment trial); 3) art. II, § 2, cl. 2, (Senate confirmation of
presidential appointments); and 4) art. II, § 2, cl. 2, (Senate ratification of treaties). Id. at
955.
71. Id. at 950.
72. "Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives-or hallmarks-of dem-
ocratic government ...." Id. at 944.
73. "But policy arguments supporting even useful 'political inventions' are subject to the
demands of the Constitution ...." Id. at 945. See also id. at 958-59.
74. Burger's standard for a legislative act is action with the "purpose and effect of alter-
ing the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons... outside the Legislative Branch." Id.
at 952. Since this definition can apply to any government act-legislative, judicial, or execu-
tive-the standard is at best unclear. Burger's standard can also be read as imposing formal
requirements on any act of the legislature simply because it has acted. See also Tribe, The
Legislative Veto Decision: A Law By Any Other Name?, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 8-10
(1984).
75. See infra notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
76. 462 U.S. 919, 960-62. Justice Powell concurred in the judgment only.
77. "The breadth of this holding gives one pause. Congress has included the veto in
literally hundreds of statutes.... [T]he respect due its [Congress'] judgment as a coordinate
branch of Government cautions that our holding should be no more extensive than necessary
to decide these cases." Id. at 959-60.
78. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
79. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 962 (quoting Justice Jackson, 343 U.S. at 635).
80. Id. at 963.
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cluded that Congress' act was adjudicatory and not legislative 8 1-
thus "exceed[ing] the scope of its constitutionally prescribed
authority." 82
In a lengthy dissent, Justice White reiterated Powell's concern
with the reach of the decision. He cited a number of instances
where the legislative veto was instrumental in resolving executive-
legislative policy-making disputes, including the Impoundment
Control Act. 3 The veto had allowed Congress to retain control
and enhance accountability over an increasingly complex and
sprawling executive bureaucracy.84
B. Impact on Congress
At the time of the decision it was variously estimated that some
200 statutory provisions were affected, and in the months following
Chadha, Congress passed 53 additional laws with legislative veto
provisions attached." There was mixed reaction to the Chadha de-
cision on Capitol Hill, and hearings were initiated to explore alter-
native devices of control.8" These ranged from a constitutional
amendment to establish the legality of the legislative veto, to "re-
port and wait" provisions which delay implementation of an execu-
tive decision for a definite period after Congress is notified so it can
act, 87 to prior notification or consultation with the appropriate
81. Id. at 964-65. In Chadha, a Kenyan student sought to avoid deportation when his
visa expired by applying for permanent resident status under section 244(a)(1) of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act. The immigration judge, acting under the provisions of the INA,
determined that Chadha met the requirements of the INA (good moral character and depor-
tation would cause extreme hardship) and granted his request. A year and a half later, the
House Judiciary subcommittee with jurisdiction over INA introduced a resolution which
reversed the immigration judge's finding. The House adopted the resolution, and the immi-
gration judge was bound to order Chadha deported. The distinction raised by Justice Powell
was that the INS judge was performing a judicial function statutorily delegated by the Con-
gress and outside the competence of the Congress. See also Tribe, supra note 74, at 15-17.
82. Chada, 462 U.S. at 967.
83. The Court "sounds the death knell for nearly 200 other statutory provisions ....
Id. "Today's decision strikes down in one fell swoop provisions in more laws enacted by
Congress than the Court has cumulatively invalidated in its history." Id. at 1002.
84. Justice White characterized the veto as "a means of defense, a reservation of ulti-
mate authority necessary if Congress is to fulfill its designated role under Art. I as the Na-
tion's lawmaker." Id. at 974.
85. Judicial Misjudgments, supra note 5, at 706.
86. CONGRESS AND THE NATION 1981-84, supra note 22, at 837-38.
87. This is similar to the rescission process; the burden may lie with either the President
or the Congress. The HUD regulations are reported in this manner. Proposed regulations
are submitted semiannually to congressional committees for review and are automatically
published for comment 15 legislative days after notification unless Congress acts. Once a
regulation is published as final, it is not effective for 20 legislative days during which the
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oversight committee before executive action,88 or a joint resolution
of approval of an agency action. 9 Statutes with the disabling provi-
sion were either modified statutorily by Congress or have been grad-
ually litigated on a case-by-case basis to determine how much of the
law could survive if the offending provision was removed.90
C. City of New Haven v. United States
After Chadha, the deferral mechanism of the Impoundment
Control Act was not altered. Instead, a political accommodation
between the administration and Congress permitted Congress to
consider deferrals as though the statute was intact. Deferral resolu-
tions were attached to appropriations bills.91 The administration
agreed not to veto legislation solely because it included a deferral
disapproval. 92 However, after David Stockman left as the Office of
Management and Budget ("OMB") Director and was replaced by
James Miller, the agreement broke down. .On February 5, 1986,
President Reagan sent deferral messages to Congress to suspend
$5.3 billion from housing programs for the poor and elderly.93
committees review and may legislatively disapprove. 42 U.S.C. § 3535(o) (1982). The "re-
port and wait" procedure was approved in Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 15 (1941).
88. This is the procedure used in the reprogramming of funds. The informal exchange
alerts each side to proposed actions in order to head off later policy disputes.
89. A joint resolution meets both the bicameralism and presentment requirements and is
a law. In 1984 it was used to approve the administration's reorganization plan. See CON-
GRESS AND THE NATION 1981-84, supra note 22, at 838-39; Judicial Misjudgments, supra
note 5, at 709.
90. See supra note 2.
91. See Deferral Defects Hearing, supra note 57, at 5-6; Deferral Process Hearing, supra
note 57, at 4 (statements of Hon. Jamie L. Whitten, Chairman of House Appropriations
Committee). Since the House rules do not permit legislative language to be included in ap-
propriations bills, Congressman Whitten had to request a waiver of the rules to include the
deferral disapprovals. See also L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CON-
GRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 238 (1985) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS].
92. 44 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2915 (Nov. 15, 1986).
93. The President's budget for fiscal year 1987 submitted on February 5, 1986, included
$22.3 billion in deferrals for the then-current fiscal year 1986. This total was later revised
downward to $13.3 billion because of release of some funds and reclassification of other defer-
rals as rescissions. See 44 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 737 (Apr. 5, 1986); 792 (Apr. 12, 1986);
Deferral Defects Hearing, supra note 57, at 6. The $5.3 billion in impounded housing funds
became the focus for litigation challenging the President's authority to defer for policy rea-
sons. See City of New Haven v. United States, 634 F. Supp. 1449 (D.D.C. 1986), afftd, 809
F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Funds were impounded for four programs:
1) Section 8 Housing Assistance Payments Program (direct housing subsidy for low income
families): fiscal year 1986 $2.4 billion appropriated, all but $184 million deferred);
2) Section 202 (housing assistance for elderly and handicapped with direct loans to private
non-profit corporations, certain public agencies for construction, and rent subsidies): fiscal
year 1986 $631 million appropriated for loans for construction, $600 million deferred; $1.6
billion appropriated for rent subsidies, all but $12.8 million deferred;
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Congress had rejected the administration's proposed cuts in these
same programs the year before.94 Controversy between Congress
and the President had been growing as legislators sensed-an attempt
by the President to now use deferral powers in the same way Nixon
had-to kill programs with which he did not agree."
Four House Democrats,96 the National League of Cities, six in-
dividual cities,97 and the Public Citizen Litigation Group filed suit
on February 20, 1986, to challenge the deferral authority of the
President and to seek an injunction for immediate release of the
funds.98 Oral arguments were heard March 24 on an expedited ba-
sis in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Both
sides conceded the unconstitutionality of the one-House legislative
veto provision.99 The argument focused on whether or not the en-
tire deferral provision, section 1013, should also fall with the veto.
Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson, writing for a three-judge panel,
granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. 1o An injunc-
tion was ordered to release the impounded funds for the four hous-
ing programs, which was stayed until the appeals process was
completed. 10 1 The case was argued November 12, 1986, before a
three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.1"2 The unanimous decision, handed down on
January 20, 1987, strongly affirmed the district court's findings.
3) Community Development Block Grant: fiscal year 1986 $3.1 billion appropriated, $500
million deferred;
4) Section 312 (rehabilitation loans for low income neighborhoods): fiscal year 1986 Con-
gress directed that $166 million remaining in the program be available, $135 million deferred.
634 F. Supp. at 1451-52. See also 44 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 737-38 (Apr. 5, 1986) (descrip-
tion of the local impact of the program cuts).
94. 44 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2915 (Nov. 15, 1986); 45 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 145
(Jan. 24, 1987).
95. 44 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 678 (Mar. 22, 1986); 2915 (Nov. 15, 1986).
96. Barbara Boxer - California; Mike Lowry - Washington; Bruce A. Morrison - Con-
necticut; Charles E. Schumer - New York.
97. Seattle, Washington; San Francisco, California; Charlotte, North Carolina; Kansas
City, Missouri; New York, New York; Los Angeles, California. Separate suits were filed by
Chicago, Illinois and New Haven, Connecticut and consolidated with the National League of
Cities suit.
98. City of New Haven v. United States, 634 F. Supp. 1449 (D.D.C. 1986). See also 44
CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 565 (Mar. 8, 1986); 737-38 (Apr. 5, 1986).
99. 634 F. Supp. at 1451, 1453. The National League of Cities' objective was to obtain
release of the money quickly. Conceding the unconstitutionality of the legislative veto as-
sured the NLC a strong case.
100. 634 F. Supp. at 1451, 1460,
101. Id. at 1460.
102. City of New Haven v. United States, 809 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The govern-
ment had 90 days in which to file an appeal. Since it failed to do so, the decision stands and
section 1013 is invalid. It is interesting to note that one of the three judges was Robert
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One month following the district court's findings, the Section
202 housing funds were released by OMB in the spring of 1986.03
Subsequently, Congress voted in June to disapprove the three dis-
puted deferrals. The disapproval was included in the 1986 Urgent
Supplemental Appropriations bill which President Reagan signed
into law on July 2. 14 Because the President had threatened to veto
the supplemental appropriations bill since it also contained a House
provision to delete the deferral power from the Impoundment Con-
trol Act, the House conferees agreed to drop this language in return
for a written promise from OMB Director Miller that the adminis-
tration would not make any more policy deferrals for the balance of
1986.105
In the initial New Haven litigation, the government presented
three arguments. 1 0 6 First, the government argued that the power to
defer should remain intact with severance of the legislative veto
since the intent of the Congress in adopting the Impoundment Con-
trol Act was solely to provide Congress with notice of the deferrals.
Retaining the deferral power while discarding only the legislative
veto would still meet the notice requirement. Since the severability
standard is based in part on a determination of whether the remain-
ing statute is workable, the government cited as proof the fact that
deferrals had operated without difficulty since the 1983 decision.' 7
Second, since neither the authorization nor appropriations bills
specified the timing of the expenditures, the government maintained
that the President has independent discretion, from his authority to
execute the laws, to determine and revise an appropriate spending
schedule. This discretion exists separate from any authority
Bork-a Reagan Supreme Court nominee recently denied Senate confirmation-who, as a
Justice Department official, defended the Nixon impoundment policy.
103. Appellee's Brief, United States of America, at 9, City of New Haven v. United
States, 809 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
104. Urgent Supplemental Appropriations Bill, supra note 12; 44 CONG. Q. WEEKLY
REP. 1550-53 (July 5, 1986); 2915 (Nov. 15, 1986).
105. 44 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1422 (June 21, 1986). See also id. at 1249 (May 31,
1986); 1364 (June 14, 1986); 1513 (June 28, 1986).
106. City of New Haven, 809 F.2d at 900. See Appellant's Brief at 13-18 for a summary
of these arguments.
107. Apellant's Brief at 27-29. The government also argued that Congress' dispute with
President Nixon focused on the President's refusal to spend money (i.e. rescissions) rather
than delays in spending. Deferrals, appellants argued, are "presumptively valid." The mech-
anism for disapproval is of less importance than notice that the President is exercising author-
ity to delay spending. Id. at 38-39. For further analysis of how the deferral process has
worked after Chadha see infra notes 198-216 and accompanying text.
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granted by the Impoundment Control Act.108 The district court de-
clined to rule on this issue, since the President acted on authority of
section 1013 of the Impoundment Control Act and did not assert an
independent basis for his deferral action.1°9
Third, the government argued that even if the court should
strike the entire deferral provision, it should also strike the 1974
amendment to the Anti-Deficiency Act which deleted the "other
developments" language. The government argued that since the
Budget Act represented a political accommodation between the two
branches, any changes by judicial decree should restore the status
quo ante. 110 The district court rejected this argument and applied
the standard to save as much of the statute as was consistent with
legislative intent."'
The cities' response was that the government's view of the legis-
lative history behind impoundment was completely unfounded."12
Severing the veto provision from the deferral process ignored obvi-
ous legislative intent to control the impoundment process, not sim-
ply to be notified of executive deferral actions. In addition, the
critical point is that severing only the veto power of Congress would
give the President a line-item veto power' 13-a power which Presi-
dent Reagan has continually urged be granted him. Congress has
steadfastly refused to grant such a powerful legislative tool to the
President, since such a power would make congresssional delibera-
tions and enactments superfluous. Although the President had
signed an appropriations bill into law, he could under this theory,
selectively withhold spending for any program which was not part
of his agenda. Should the Congress pass new appropriations for the
targeted programs, the President could then veto the legislation and
take steps to circumvent a successful two-thirds vote override.
The government argued that a deferral is not a true veto, since
the funds must be made available before the end of the fiscal year.
Judge Jackson responded that this "ignores the practical realities of
108. Appellant's Brief at 44-45, City of New Haven v. United States, 809 F.2d 900 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
109. City of New Haven, 634 F. Supp. at 1460. Thus, the assertion that the President has
inherent constitutional authority to not spend remains unaddressed by the courts.
110. Appellant's Brief at 58-60, City of New Haven v. United States, 809 F.2d 900 (D.C.
Cir. 1987); City of New Haven, 634 F. Supp. at 1459.
111. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals similarly rejected this argument. "The amend-
ment to the Anti-Deficiency Act... is fully consistent with the expressed intent of Congress
to control presidential impoundments. Thus, there is absolutely no basis for overturning
Congress' amendment to the Anti-Deficiency Act." City of New Haven, 809 F.2d at 909.
112. Appellee's Brief at 42-51, City of New Haven, 809 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
113. Appellee's Brief at 40-41.
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the budget process, however, for when the expenditure of funds is
deferred for one year, those funds remain available and may be used
to offset budgetary requirements for the following fiscal year.""' 4
The net result would be a cut in the program.
In his May 16 opinion, Judge Jackson carefully traced the legis-
lative history of the Impoundment Control Act and observed that
"[i]t is apparent from historical circumstances alone that the legisla-
tion to which Congress was building would be designed and ex-
pected to mark the limits of Congressional and Presidential power
in the matter of impoundments" beyond the then-current dispute
with President Nixon. 1 5 The notice provision of the Impoundment
Control Act was important, but "merely incidental" in comparison
with the veto as an instrument for control. In his analysis of the
integral nature of the veto to the enacted law, Judge Jackson
concluded:
It can be said with conviction that Congress would have pre-
ferred no statute to one without the one-House veto provision,
for with no statute at all, the President would be remitted to such
pre-ICA authority as he might have had for particular deferrals
which, in Congress' view (and that of most of the courts having
passed upon it) was not much.' 16
III. COMPETING CLAIMS TO SPENDING AUTHORITY
The power to appropriate public monies is explicitly given to
Congress in the Constitution. 11 7 However, the power to control the
expenditure of those funds is not stated. It is through the power of
the purse and the authority to make the laws that Congress has
asserted its prerogative to see that its mandate is carried out by the
executive. This view of separation of powers assumes an oversight
function to assure that legislative powers or policies are not dimin-
ished or thwarted. The executive views separation of powers in a
different manner-that Congress' powers end when the law has
been enacted and that the legislature should not interfere with or
oversee in the implementation of those laws. From this perspective,
implementation is an explicitly executive function.
In the give and take of the political process, the functional pow-
ers of the two branches overlap. Congress has available to it several
114. City of New Haven, 634 F. Supp. at 1458.
115. Id. at 1455.
116. Id. at 1459.
117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7: "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law. .. "
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constitutionally permissible methods for oversight of the execu-
tive.' 18 The President through a primary leadership role for the
country and political party has enormous influence over the legisla-
tive process. The President is given legislative power to propose
legislation to the Congress. Executive officials have ready access
both formally and informally to the relevant congressional commit-
tees to present the administration's position and supporting docu-
mentation. The administration proposal is often the starting point
for the discussion.1 19 This is certainly true in the case of the budget,
since the President is statutorily required to present his budget pro-
posal, including projected revenue receipts and outlays, to the
Budget and Appropriations Committees of both Houses. 20 The
President can also veto bills. A supermajoritarian response from
both Houses of Congress is required to defeat the President.1 21
When there is a strong and popular President, a national emer-
gency, or a politically controversial issue, Congress is often hesitant
to go against the President's wishes.
Claims to discretionary authority over spending derive from two
principal sources: statutory authority specifically given to the Presi-
dent 122 and inherent constitutional authority. 123 Particularly in
times of emergency or general national crisis or when strong presi-
dential leadership acts in harmony with congressional priorities,
Congress has vested discretionary authority over spending pro-
grams in the President. When the crisis has passed or there are
executive-legislative tensions over policy as in a split government,
118. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
119. The 1974 Budget Act made some major changes to strengthen the Congress' negoti-
ating position. The Budget Act now requires, in addition to the annual budget proposal from
the President, submission of a current services budget which projects what would happen if
there were no changes in existing law. This base-line budget now gives Congress additional
leverage in its negotiations. In addition, the Budget Act established the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO), an independent, professional, nonpartisan staff which assists the House
and the Senate in its budget work. As an analogue to OMB, it has helped restore some
balance to the congressional side of the ledger.
120. The reporting requirement originated in the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921
and is now codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1105 (1982 and Supp. III 1985). See infra notes 138-43
and accompanying text.
121. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
122. Statutory authorization is the discretionary authority most commonly relied on,
either from an explicit statement in the law or implied through omission of mandatory lan-
guage. President Nixon argued that the lack of explicit, mandatory language gave him au-
thority to withhold funds. See 1973 Hearings, supra note 37, at 841.
123. Inherent authority is derived from the vesting of executive power in the President
and a duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
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the Congress will reassert its control through mandatory spending
language in its appropriations or authorization bills.
A. Evolution of Shared Power
As Hamilton observed in Federalist 30: "Money is, with propri-
ety, considered as the vital principle of the body politic."124 Con-
trol over the purse strings is clearly one of the most potent tools a
government possesses. The Congress derives its power of the purse
explicitly from the Constitution: "No money shall be drawn from
the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
Law.... "125 Congress as the law-making body also exercises the
authority "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." '26 The
President is directed to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted." '127 The power to appropriate is thus separated from the im-
plementation of spending programs as a check on abuse of power.
Placing both decision and execution powers in the same branch
would concentrate enormous power with no built-in restraint. Such
concentration of power would surely raise legitimate concerns
about abuse of power of the sort with which the Framers were so
deeply concerned.
Historical developments in the appropriations and budget pro-
cess are important factors to consider in analyzing the extent and
source of executive discretion in withholding appropriated funds.
Although the constitutional powers appear to be allocated sepa-
rately to the Congress to appropriate and the President to faithfully
execute, in fact the legislative-executive relationship in the appro-
priations process has become interwoven as the complexity of the
governmental functions has increased.
1. The Early Appropriations Process
The first congressional appropriation in 1789 was a brief lump
sum measure setting out four general classes of expenditures for the
new government.1 28 In contrast, the 1793 appropriation bill was a
very detailed line-item appropriation greatly limiting any discre-
124. THE FEDERALIST No. 30, at 188 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
125. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
126. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
127. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3.
128. L. FISHER, supra note 28, at 60. The accounts appropriated were: "$216,000 for the
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tionary spending authority to the President.12 9 Appropriations in
lump sum amounts as opposed to highly specific line-item budgets
offered greater spending discretion to the executive. Swings be-
tween lump sum and line-item budget authority would alternately
expand or restrict the discretionary authority of the President to
control the level of spending. Generally, the discretion granted has
been broader during periods of national emergency-war or depres-
sion.13 0 When the crisis passed, the delegation narrowed.
The codification in 1809 of the itemized appropriation led to
two administrative practices 31 which circumvented the rigidity of
the line-item system. One was the transfer of excess funds from one
budget account to take up'the deficiency which had occurred in an-
other. Congress limited, then broadened and ultimately repealed
administrative transfer authority in 1868.132
The other was the so-called "coercive deficiency." '133 Annual
appropriations bills provided agencies with lump sum amounts
which were to be roughly apportioned in quarterly installments
over the fiscal year. With no central control over the spending rate,
agencies would routinely spend until their authority was exhausted
and then request a deficiency appropriation to carry them through
the balance of the fiscal year. If Congress refused additional appro-
priations, agency operations would be shut down and the blame
would be attributed to congressional stinginess. 134
2. Modern Statutory Underpinnings
In the early years, Congress appropriated funds with varying
degrees of specificity and the President executed the agreed-to poli-
civil list, $137,000 for the War Department, $190,000 to discharge warrants issued by the
previous Board of Treasury, and $96,000 for pensions to disabled veterans."
129. Id. "By 1793, appropriations were descending to such minutiae as $450 for fire-
wood, stationery, printing, and other contingencies for the Treasurer's office."
130. Id. at 61-63.
131. Abascal & Kramer 1, supra note 26, at 1580. These practices were sanctioned by the
Act of May 3, 1809, which gave the President limited authority to shift funds from one
account to another.
132. Id. at 1581-82.
133. See id. at 1580-81.
134. See id. at 1582. After Congress prohibited the use of transfers, it also tried to elimi-
nate deficiency appropriations by requiring agencies to spend within the appropriated budg-
ets. However, the Postmaster General in 1879 got around the language of this law by
entering into contract obligations of $1.7 million for future services. In requesting deficiency
appropriations to meet the future obligation, he argued that the Congress could, if it wished
to preserve the law, annul the contracts with a month's severance and halt the mails. Con-
gress, of course, was forced to appropriate the additional funds. But an administrative ability
to circumvent statutory language was gradually unfolding.
19871
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
cies and programs. By the turn of this century, however, spending
abuse by the agencies and a failure to coordinate expenditures over
the full fiscal year led to enactment of the Anti-Deficiency Act in
1905.135 Congress asserted its control over appropriations by re-
quiring the agencies to apportion their spending on a monthly or
other basis to prevent deficiency appropriation requests. Waivers or
modifications were, however, permitted on written orders of the
agency heads. 136 Due to widespread abuse of the waiver provision,
the following year Congress amended the waiver provision, permit-
ting its use only in the event of some unforeseen " 'extraordinary
emergency or unusual circumstance.' "137
In 1921 Congress passed the Budget and Accounting Act.138
The debates during this period reflected the tension between provid-
ing the executive with control over agency spending levels and re-
taining the principal appropriations powers within the control of
the Congress. The President not only wanted budget-making staff,
but also recognition of an executive budget, which would limit Con-
gress' power to increase spending levels or add new programs. 139
Congress specifically rejected the concept of an executive budget
which would have required Congress to act within the budget limits
set by the President. The Budget Bureau was to act as a filter for
the President's budget requests, which were viewed by Congress as
simply a reflection of the administration's wishes. Congress refused
to give up its constitutional powers, and the leadership emphasized
"that the Act would leave unaltered the existing distribution of
powers between the President and Congress.'' 4°
135. Act of Mar. 3, 1905, Pub. L. No. 58-217, § 4, 33 Stat. 1214, 1257-1258 (codified as
amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1349-1351, 1511-1519 (1982 and Supp. III 1985)). The re-
strictive language was added to this deficiency appropriations bill to forbid expenditures in
excess of appropriations, to require apportionment except on waiver, and to impose a per-
sonal criminal penalty of removal from office, a fine of not less than $100 and imprisonment
for not less than one month. See also L. FISHER, supra note 28, at 233-34.
136. See L. FISHER, supra note 28, at 233. For a thorough historical background on the
factors leading to enactment of the Anti-Deficiency Act, see also Abascal & Kramer I, supra
note 26, at 1583-87.
137. Act of Feb. 27, 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-28, § 3, 34 Stat. 27, 48 (codified as amended at
31 U.S.C. §§ 1511-1519 (1982)). These restrictive provisions were added to an urgent defi-
ciency appropriations bill. See also L. FISHER, supra note 28, at 234.
138. Act of June 10, 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-13, 42 Stat. 20 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 31 U.S.C. §§ 701-778, and §§ 1101-1114 (1982 and Supp. III 1985)).
139. Abascal & Kramer I, supra note 26, at 1591.
140. Id. Abascal & Kramer argue that Congress' firm resistance to transfer of its power
to the President is critical to understanding the impoundment issue. There was tremendous
economic pressure brought on by wartime debts and political pressures flowing from enact-
ment of a federal income tax which argued that Congress was ill-equipped institutionally to
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The Budget and Accounting Act created the Bureau of the
Budget within the Treasury Department to coordinate presentation
of an annual comprehensive budget with estimated expenditures
and revenues and requested appropriations.141 The Budget and Ac-
counting Act retained in Congress the power to revise the appropri-
ation estimates up or down in light of national policy prerogatives it
established. 42 Congress in turn reformed its splintered appropria-
tions committee structure and established single appropriations
committees in each House with an intent to report out a single
money bill.143
The first Budget Director, Charles G. Dawes, treated appropria-
tions as spending ceilings and instituted an administrative regula-
tion to effect savings through establishment of a General Reserve. 1"
deal effectively with the budget. For a thorough background of events leading up to enact-
ment of the Budget and Accounting Act, see id. at 1595-99.
141. Id. at 1598-99. See also L. FISHER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: POWER AND
POLICY (1972). Unlike establishment of the Departments of State and War which Congress
considered purely executive departments, the Treasury Department was viewed as serving the
Congress as well as the President. Congress jealously guarded its constitutional control over
revenues. It specifically placed the Bureau of the Budget in the Treasury and not in the
White House, on the theory that Congress could then retain control over revenue matters.
See id. at 86-89.
142. L. FISHER, THE POLrIcs OF SHARED POWER, supra note 37, at 39. Although
Congress asserted the primacy of the legislative budget, its splintered appropriations process
worked against development of a legislative budget. Until the Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974, the only comprehensive budget proposal the Congress worked with was
the President's. Congressional deliberations on appropriations could only effectively work
changes on the edges of the administration's proposals. See Issue Presentations Before the
House Rules Comm. Task Force on the Budget Process, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 147, 161-62 (Oct.
1984) (statement of Shirley Ruhe, House Budget Committee). See also Abascal & Kramer I,
supra note 26, at 1566.
143. L. FISHER, supra note 28, at 36-37. This reform was short-lived. Instead of waiting
for each of the subcommittees of the Appropriations Committee to report out its bill and then
combine them into one, the Appropriations Committee presented each bill separately. Id. at
37. The only other time a single appropriations bill was attempted was in 1950. Fear that the
President could veto an entire budget in one stroke soon eliminated this reform. Today, the
appropriations committees each have 13 subcommittees. Appropriations bills are then acted
on in the subcommittees and reported out separately for consideration by the House and
Senate. However, the authorizing committees must act first to authorize a program before
the appropriations committees can appropriate funds to enact programs. Authorization bills
are ceilings - "It is authorized to be appropriated.. ." - beyond which an appropriation
may not go. Money cannot be released from the Treasury until an appropriation has been
enacted into law.
144. Abascal & Kramer I, supra note 26, at 1600-03. Reserves from appropriated funds
were made available only to meet unforeseen emergencies and to effect savings and only with
the authorization of the Budget Bureau. In addition, this procedure eliminated the "June
rush" by which agencies felt obligated to spend all of the appropriated funds before the end of
the fiscal year. The individual agency heads were no longer allowed to set apportionment
schedules; that decision was given to the Budget Bureau.
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By 1933, the Budget Bureau had established control over the coor-
dination of legislative requests from the executive agencies to Con-
gress. In 1939, a revised Reorganization Act directed the President
to consolidate and abolish governmental agencies for efficiency and
economy reasons.' 45 President Roosevelt used this authority to
transfer the Budget Bureau to the new Executive Office of the Presi-
dent, thus centralizing budget control and bringing it within the
White House.
In 1950, the Anti-Deficiency Act was again amended to en-
courage agencies to set aside surplus funds for unanticipated emer-
gencies. 146  The amended act authorized the establishment of
budgetary reserves "to provide for contingencies, or to effect savings
whenever savings are made possible by or through changes in re-
quirements, greater efficiency of operations, or other developments
subsequent to the date on which such appropriation was made
available."' 147  President Nixon relied principally on this statutory
authority and its critical "other developments" language to justify
the impoundments early in his first term. 148  One noted authority
has observed that the legislative purpose behind the language "was
to build up surpluses in some accounts in order to balance deficien-
cies that developed elsewhere. Nowhere was there an implied au-
145. L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 91, at 164-66. Congress gave
this authority only on the condition that the reorganization proposal be submitted to Con-
gress for review. The reorganization was effective 60 days after submission unless disap-
proved by concurrent resolution of both Houses. Id. at 166.
146. Act of Sept. 6, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-759, § 1211, 64 Stat. 595, 765 (codified as
amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 1511-1519 (1982)).
147. 31 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) (emphasis added), cited in L. FISHER, supra note 28, at 154.
The 1950 language grew out of another Post Office dispute. In 1947 the Post Office appor-
tioned its funds so that there was a short-fall in the final quarter. The Post Office threatened
to limit services unless additional funds were appropriated. The legislative purpose of the
amendment was to build up reserves to pay for any unanticipated deficiencies without resort-
ing to additional appropriations. L. FISHER, supra note 28, at 155.
148. See 1973 Hearings, supra note 37, at 366 (statement of Deputy Attorney General
Joseph Sneed). Id. at 529 for the OMB interpretation of 1950 Anti-Deficiency Act:
In light of the fact that spending under conventional appropriations is not
mandatory, the authority to establish reserves because of "other developments sub-
sequent to the day on which such appropriation was made available" should be
construed broadly. Thus "other developments" would encompass any circum-
stances which arise after an appropriation becomes available for use, which would
reasonably justify the establishment of a reserve.
President Nixon used impoundment as an executive tool to severely cut back or cancel pro-
grams without any notice to Congress. This marked a major departure from past executive
impoundment actions. See L. FISHER, supra note 28, at 176-77. "In other words, the mere
existence of discretionary authority, which had been granted by Congress to enable executive
officials to administer the programs more effectively, was used as an excuse to deny the pro-
grams in their entirety." Id. at 177.
[Vol. 38:66
STRUGGLE OVER SPENDING POWER
thority to set aside reserves to cancel or curtail a program. At no
time was the Antideficiency Act conceived of as a tool for stabiliz-
ing the economy." 49
President Nixon also instituted another important structural
change when he reorganized the Budget Bureau into the Office of
Management and Budget ("OMB") in 1970. He asserted that the
priority of the new OMB would be to evaluate "the extent to which
programs are actually achieving their intended results, and deliver-
ing the intended services to the intended recipients."' 150 Growing
confrontation between Nixon and the Congress over impoundment
led only to a modest modification of the OMB reorganization pro-
posal in 1974. The powers and duties which Congress had statuto-
rily vested in the Budget Bureau became vested in the President
under Nixon's reorganization and could be delegated by him and
not by the Congress. 5 Since Congress had established the Budget
Bureau to be responsive to Congress' reporting requests, this move
greatly enhanced the President's control over the budget process.
However, nominations for the Director and Deputy Director of
OMB now required Senate approval.
152
B. Statutory Authority
There are a variety of ways in which the President can withhold
spending under the law. Under the Anti-Deficiency Act, the Presi-
dent is directed to establish reserves to provide for contingencies or
from savings in program efficiencies."5 3 Using the authority of the
Anti-Deficiency Act, as amended in 1950, President Nixon argued
that the reserve language permitted him to adjust spending levels
downward in the face of spiraling inflation. Since the Congress had
refused to take responsible action in this area and the economic sit-
uation had reached emergency proportions, Nixon claimed both
statutory and inherent power to act.1 54 However, Nixon's priorities
149. L. FISHER, supra note 28, at 156.
150. Executive Order 11541, 31 U.S.C. § 501 (1982), cited in L. FISHER, supra note 28, at
47.
151. Id at 49-51. "All budget functions transferred to the President were delegated to
the OMB Director, such functions to be carried out by the Director 'under the direction of
the President and pursuant to such further instructions as the President from time to time
may issue.'" Id. at 51 (quoting from Executive Order 11541).
152. Id at 51-54.
153. See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
154. See 1973 Hearings, supra note 37, at 358-402 (testimony of Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral Joseph Sneed). See also The Washington Post, February 1, 1973, reprinted in 1973 Hear-
ings, supra note 37, at 1019.
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were very different from those of the Congress, and for the first
time, substantial cutbacks were made in domestic programs, partic-
ularly those with which the President philosophically disagreed. As
amended in 1974, the Anti-Deficiency Act now provides only lim-
ited executive discretion to refuse to spend appropriated funds.155
Congress has also used governmental reogranization acts to di-
rect the President to eliminate inefficiency and waste and to reduce
government spending. To assure control over the process, Congress
has attached language to the law stipulating that the reorganization
plan be submitted to Congress for review before becoming
effective. 156
Some programs are funded as "no-year" appropriations, to be
spent over an unspecified time until expended. Purchases of mili-
tary equipment and construction of public buildings are examples of
such programs.1 17 In addition, federal funds can be withheld from
recipient organizations which discriminate in violation of Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1'
The public debt limit has been used as a justification for with-
holding funds. As one scholar observed, this was merely a pretext
for the administration to selectively excise programs which it did
not want and fully fund those programs it supported. 5 9 Spending
ceilings have occasionally been enacted with a percentage reduction
formula for agency budgets. These may directly conflict with ap-
propriations already enacted and can become a source of executive
abuse. 160
Lastly, the language of the statute itself has caused interpreta-
tion problems. 161 President Nixon argued that appropriations bills
155. ICA, § 1002.
156. See, e.g., supra note 145 and accompanying text.
157. See Fisher, Funds Impounded by the President: The Constitutional Issue, 38 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 124, 125 (1969).
158. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VI, § 602, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-I
(1982).
159. L. FiSHER, supra note 28, at 153. See also Levinson & Mills, Impoundment: A
Search for Legal Principles, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 191, 206 (1974).
160. L. FISHER, supra note 28, at 152-153. President Nixon used the ceiling as a tool for
cutting unwanted domestic programs. The Congress refused to enact another such spending
ceiling since it could not limit executive discretion. The automatic spending cut mechanism
in the Gramm-Rudman law is an updated version of the spending ceiling. This "automatic"
mechanism, declared unconstitutional in Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986), was
designed to minimize the President's discretion to make cuts selectively. The Gramm-Rud-
man law has been amended to correct its constitutional infirmity. Currently in force, its
automatic sequestering provisions are now forcing the Reagan Administration to negotiate
with the Congress on budget policy.
161. All the litigation on impoundment of funds and currently on severability has focused
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were simply authorizations or "ceilings" for spending, and, absent
mandatory language, he as the chief executive had discretion to
spend less than the full allocation. Yet this rationale completely
ignores the fact that an appropriations bill, passed by both Houses
of Congress and signed by the President, is a law. The appropria-
tion reflects a consensus on policy as to the allocation of resources.
Fiscal restraints on programs which severely limit their scope and
inhibit performance are in fact policy determinations-legislative
acts-made unilaterally by the executive in disregard of Congress'
determination. Enactment of the Impoundment Control Act nar-
rowed and focused the scope of executive discretion. 162 When Con-
gress passed the law, it recognized the need to retain the executive's
capability to manage the federal bureaucracy while eliminating the
need for Congress to reaffirm its past legislative judgments in the
face of impoundments.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY
The remaining constitutional issue which the Supreme Court
has not yet decided is whether the President has inherent power to
withhold the spending of appropriated funds. Few of the impound-
ment cases have addressed the inherent power of the President to
withhold spending.1 63 This constitutional issue has only been raised
as an alternative theory to statutory powers.
The constitutional basis for the inherent powers argument is
found in Article II, the vesting of executive power in the Presi-
dent' 64 and the requirement to faithfully execute the laws. 165 Dur-
ing the Nixon presidency, this constitutional claim appeared to be
an unlimited discretion: "The President's obligation to faithfully
on congressional intent and statutory construction. The courts in the 1970s overwhelmingly
rejected the government's interpretation of the statutory language. See supra note 39. Since
the initial litigation, Congress has inserted explicitly mandatory language in the authorization
and appropriations bills.
162. See supra notes 42-63 and accompanying text.
163. Those courts which did, soundly rejected any finding of inherent power. See Cam-
paign Clean Water, Inc. v. Train, 489 F.2d 492, 498 (1973) ("When the executive exercises its
responsibility under appropriation legislation in such a manner as to frustrate the Congres-
sional purpose, either by absolute refusal to spend or by a withholding of so substantial an
amount of the appropriation as to make impossible the attainment of the legislative goals, the
executive trespasses beyond the range of its legal discretion ...."); State of Louisiana ex rel
Guste v. Brinegar, 388 F. Supp. 1319, 1324-25 (1975) (citing Justice Black's argument in The
Steel Seizure Case with approval and noting that the executive power and faithful execution
clauses "are hardly grants of legislative power"). See also L. FISHER, COURT CASES, supra
note 40, at 76-82.
164. U.S. CONST. art. II, § I.
165. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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execute the laws plainly includes an obligation to prevent waste." 66
Given the Congress' demonstrated inability to responsibly manage
the economic problems of inflation and a swollen budget, Deputy
Attorney General Joseph Sneed further argued:
Our Nation needs the impounding authority vested in the Presi-
dent to check this otherwise ruinous tendency of Congress. The
exercise of this authority by the President to promote fiscal sta-
bility is not usurpation; rather it is in the great tradition of
checks and balances upon which our Constitution is based.1 67
Clearly the definition of "waste" in fiscal policy can and did differ
dramatically between the Republican President and Democratic
Congress. Similarly, promoting "fiscal stability" meant making
choices between alternative programs-a legislative act-which
Congress had already performed through its appropriations process.
There are few Supreme Court decisions which bear on this dis-
cussion. One of the earliest is Kendall v. United States ex rel.
Stokes.1 68 During President Jackson's administration the Postmas-
ter General refused to pay an individual for contracted mail deliv-
ery services although Congress had specifically appropriated funds
to do so. In holding that the Postmaster General must pay, the
Court stated: "To contend that the obligation imposed on the Pres-
ident to see the laws faithfully executed, implies the power to forbid
their execution is a novel construction of the Constitution, and en-
tirely inadmissable." 169  Although the Court's language may be
used to deny the President discretionary authority to withhold
spending, Kendall can be distinguished on its facts from the current
impoundment dispute in that it involved an individual claim for
services under a contractual obligation with the government.17 0
The impoundments at issue during the Nixon and Reagan adminis-
trations involved funding for federal programs.
166. 1973 Hearings, supra note 37, at 360 (testimony of Deputy Attorney General Joseph
Sneed).
167. Id. at 363. Although this argument is similar to the dissent in The Steel Seizure
Case, Justice Vinson stressed inherent emergency powers, those necessarily involved to assure
survival of the nation. See infra note 190 and accompanying text.
168. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
169. Id. at 613.
170. The Court further distinguished between ministerial (nondiscretionary statutory
duty) and executive (discretionary) acts, id. at 613-14, a distinction that was further devel-
oped in Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 515 (1840). This attempt by the Court to
allocate authority to both branches does not really resolve the fundamental issue, since
neither word clarifies the distinction. One still must resort to statutory construction and
congressional intent to determine whether discretion was granted to the President.
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A. The Steel Seizure Case
The major Supreme Court decision on inherent executive pow-
ers171 is Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.172 In Youngstown,
President Truman ordered the seizure of the steel mills on April 8,
1952, after failure to settle a labor dispute threatened a nation-wide
steel strike. The President immediately notified Congress and justi-
fied his action on the basis of his executive powers and as Com-
mander in Chief. 173 In separate opinions, the Court held 6-3 that
President Truman did not have the constitutional authority in this
situation to take over steel production. The six majority opinions
did not completely reject the theory of inherent executive power
although Justices Black and Douglas clearly did and Frankfurter
and Jackson came close. However, the opinion left any such inher-
ent constitutional power which might exist severely limited and in-
sufficient to support a President's attempt to impound funds.
Writing for the Court (and joined in a concurrence by Doug-
las), 74 Justice Black found no specific constitutional or statutory
authority to justify President Truman's act.'75 Addressing specifi-
cally the President's executive power, Justice Black argued that:
"The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process to
the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he
thinks bad,"' 176 and all other law-making powers are specifically
vested in the Congress. Structurally, Black and Douglas saw the
divisions among the three branches regarding their respective pow-
ers as fairly clearly drawn. This strict view of separation of powers
was later echoed by Chief Justice Burger in the Chadha decision. 177
The four concurring Justices-Frankfurter, Jackson, Burton
and Clark-did not view the jurisdictional lines so clearly. To
Frankfurter, the three governmental branches "are partly interact-
171. The term "inherent powers" is used in the all-inclusive manner suggested by Justice
Jackson: "Loose and irresponsible use of adjectives colors all non-legal and much legal dis-
cussion of presidential powers. 'Inherent' powers, 'implied' powers, 'incidental' powers, 'ple-
nary' powers, 'war' powers and 'emergency' powers are used, often interchangeably and
without fixed or ascertainable meanings." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 646-47 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
172. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
173. At the time of the strike, the United States was still engaged in a police action in
Korea. The President was concerned that the strike might cripple the war effort. Id. at 583.
174. Id. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring).
175. "The President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of
Congress or from the Constitution itself.... It is clear that if the President had authority to
issue the order he did, it must be found in some provision of the Constitution." Id. at 585-87.
176. Id. at 587.
177. See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
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ing, not wholly disjointed."' 78 Nor do they operate in a vacuum.
Historical experiences have a way of shaping governments as well as
people, which become a "gloss" on vested executive powers.'7 9
Frankfurter did caution however that the President's powers are
not undefined.' 8° Quoting Justice Holmes, Frankfurter argued that
the duty to faithfully execute the laws "is a duty that does not go
beyond the laws or require him to achieve more than Congress sees
fit to leave within his power."'' Frankfurter did not find historical
justification sufficient to support President Truman's exercise of
presidential power.' 8 z
Justice Jackson similarly described an interwoven governmental
system but with fluctuating presidential powers "depending upon
their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress."'83 Jack-
son outlined three conditions against which to test the legality of a
President's assertion of authority.'84 In the first, the President act-
ing with Congress has maximum power to act.185 Second, the Pres-
ident acting without any congressional grant or denial of authority,
is in the "twilight zone" of uncertain power and must rely on his
own independent powers for authority to act. 186 Third, the Presi-
dent acting contrary to express or implied congressional will is act-
ing with least power, and his act is subject to strict scrutiny.18 7
Both Justices Clark and Burton focused on the Commander in
Chief powers and the right to act in a national emergency. Only the
case of an extreme emergency-"imminent invasion or threatened
attack"' 88-Burton argued, might justify inherent executive power.
Clark, however, found such a grant of power in a "grave and imper-
178. Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
179. Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government cannot supplant
the Constitution or legislation, but they give meaning to the words of a text or
supply them. It is an inadmissably narrow conception of American constitutional
law to confine it to the words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which
life has written upon them.
Id. In asserting inherent executive power, Nixon also argued that the practice of impound-
ment had been used and not objected to since the early days of the Republic. While asserting
the "gloss" of long historical use, Nixon overlooked the fact that his use of impoundments
was unprecedented in scope and nature, amounting to a major redesign of government policy.
180. 343 U.S. at 610.
181. Id., quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 177 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 611-13.
183. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
184. Id. at 635-38.
185. Id. at 635-37.
186. Id. at 637.
187. Id. at 637-38.
188. Id. at 659 (Burton, J., concurring).
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ative national emergency,"18 9 a lesser standard.
The three dissenters, Vinson, Reed, and Minton, argued that as
a requisite for faithful execution of the laws, the President has in-
herent emergency powers which here encompassed continued steel
production and stable prices critical to the ongoing war effort.
They rejected the idea that a President is an "automaton impotent
to exercise the powers of Government at a time when the survival of
the Republic itself may be at stake."19 And they cited instances
where Presidents have acted first in an emergency and then in-
formed Congress who usually approved. The Court concluded that
the President may have very limited inherent emergency powers but
the threat to the war effort of an imminent steel strike was not suffi-
ciently proved or threatening to justify seizure. 191
B. The Youngstown Principles and the Impoundment
Control Act
Applying the principles laid out in Youngstown to impound-
ment, the conclusion reached is that the President does not have
inherent power to withhold spending appropriated funds. Short of
a wartime emergency when the nation's production and economy
would have to be instantly diverted to the defense effort, any other
fiscal emergency would probably be insufficient to meet the Youngs-
town emergency standard. 192 The President has both the time and
the legislative tools to request a change in the policy. The design of
the 1974 Impoundment Control Act was to formalize that process.
When we apply Justice Jackson's analysis of executive actions to
the current conflict, there is today far less historical ambiguity
about congressional intent than President Nixon could argue ex-
isted. 193 First, a series of legal challenges to the Nixon Administra-
189. d at 662 (Clark, J., concurring).
190. Id. at 682 (Vinson, J., dissenting).
191. The crucial factor in the Court's decision was that Congress had denied such seizure
authority in the past. President Truman was not acting in a legislative void. Youngstown
Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S. at 586.
192. The anti-inflation justification for impoundment used by Nixon was rejected by the
courts. See L. FISHER, COURT CASES, supra note 40, at 83-84; Presidential Impoundment of
Appropriated Funds, House Comm. on Government Operations, supra note 39, at 63.
193. See Levinson & Mills, supra note 159, at 199. In 1969, then-Assistant Attorney
General William Rehnquist wrote that:
existence of such a broad power is supported by neither reason nor precedent.
There is, of course, no question that an appropriation act permits but does not
require the executive branch to spend funds.... It is in our view extremely difficult
to formulate a constitutional theory to justify a refusal by the President to comply
with a Congressional directive to spend. It may be argued that the spending of
money is inherently an executive function, and it seems an anomalous proposition
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tion's decision to withhold spending on housing, environmental,
and other domestic programs was successfully challenged in the
courts. By 1974, the Impoundment Control Act was enacted with
Nixon's approval. Presidents Ford and Carter adhered to the re-
porting and approval mechanisms of the Impoundment Control
Act. Reagan initially accepted the terms of the Impoundment Con-
trol Act, 194 although as President, he has continued to request line-
item veto authority from the Congress. 195 Applying Jackson's third
category-when the President is acting contrary to the express or
implied will of Congress, he has the least power to act-the
Impoundment Control Act is a particularly clear statement of
Congress' intent that the President has no authority to redesign
congressional policy through withholding.1 96 The President cannot
choose another course because it is preferable. Otherwise impound-
ment becomes in effect the unilateral rewriting of a law after enact-
ment-absent any check on presidential power-and the
Constitution did not invest so great a veto power in the
President. 197
When Congress receives a proposed budget from the President,
each House evaluates the programs and policies in light of its own
agenda. Hearings are held for administration officials as well as
public representatives. Bills are approved by each body, and the
differences are compromised in a conference bill which is resubmit-
ted to each House for approval. The bill then goes to the President
for signature (approval) or veto (disapproval). Once enacted into
law the funds are available for expenditure by the executive. By
substituting his own policy agenda and denying or significantly de-
laying funds already appropriated, the President is selectively veto-
ing those sections of the appropriations law with which he
disagrees-and for which he has no constitutional or statutory
that because the executive branch is bound to execute the laws, it is free to decline
to execute them.
1973 Hearings, supra note 37, at 393-94.
194. Candidate Reagan had also implied that the Congress should have some veto au-
thority over agency actions. See CONGRESS AND THE NATION 1981-84, supra note 22, at
833.
195. In his State of the Union address, (January 27, 1987), President Reagan again re-
quested line-item veto authority from the Congress. The rescission mechanism that remains
valid is essentially a negotiated line-item veto.
196. This finding has been clearly affirmed by both the federal district and circuit appel-
late courts in the New Haven case. 634 F. Supp. 1449 (D.D.C. 1986), aff'd 809 F.2d 900
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
197. See Mikva & Hertz, supra note 27, at 380-81: "When the Congress has considered
an expenditure and approved it, any withholding of funds will conflict with the congressional
consideration."
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power. In addition, Congress has no mechanism to force compli-
ance with the law it has enacted. It could enact a new appropria-
tions bill mandating that those withheld funds be spent. This is not,
however, a sufficient check as the President could always exercise
his veto, and should the bill then pass on an override, the President
could again ignore it. The only remedy left to Congress would then
be through the courts-an often ineffective, time-consuming, patch-
work process. This is not the proper role for the courts. The judici-
ary was not designed to arbitrate budget policy disputes between the
executive and legislative branches. Protracted litigation could also
accomplish the executive's objective of defeating or crippling the
targeted program. Litigation does not resolve the need for a pro-
spective enforcement mechanism.
V. THE CURRENT IMPASSE
The effects of both Chadha and New Haven on the Impound-
ment Control Act have left the President with very limited discre-
tion in spending authority. The Anti-Deficiency Act is now the
general statutory authority which permits non-policy deferrals-to
provide for contingencies or effect savings. The deferral provision
of the Impoundment Control Act is no longer operative. This was
the only general statutory provision authorizing policy deferrals.
Although the history is clear that spending power rests princi-
pally with the Congress, the executive-legislative relationship traced
in Part III demonstrates that the spending power is not exclusive.
The executive has acquired dominant control over the budget with
the enormous accrual of power within OMB and the executive
agencies as compared to the congressional committee structure.
Aided by judicial decisions on impoundment and adoption of the
Budget and Impoundment Control Act, Congress began to restore
some balance to the process starting in 1974. Fiscal conflicts be-
tween the Reagan Administration and Congress have revealed the
weaknesses in the legislative oversight process. The New Haven re-
sult should force the Congress to address the serious problems re-
maining, if that branch is to effectively reassert its constitutional
prerogative over spending. The critical feature of this discussion is
that the allocation of discretionary power properly remains a polit-
ical question. It needs to be resolved between the legislative and
executive branches within the new constraints imposed by the
Court.
In a series of congressional hearings in 1982 and again in 1986,
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many observers, including legislators, public officials, scholars, and
lawyers, raised concerns about the defects in assuring compliance
with Impoundment Control Act procedures. 9 ' Much of the criti-
cism was directed toward the enforcement ability of the GAO as
well as GAO's interpretation of certain critical provisions of the Im-
poundment Control Act. Some of it focused on the nature of the
political compromise which shaped the final form of the ICA.'9 9
Since Chadha, attention has shifted to the administration's abuse of
the crippled deferral process.
Congress' intent in enacting the Impoundment Control Act was
to assert review authority over all spending delays or terminations
made for policy reasons as distinct from managerial reasons. Yet
there is great difficulty in distinguishing between policy and non-
policy motives for not spending. The broad definitions used in the
Impoundment Control Act should have captured most of the
spending changes with which Congress was concerned." ° Under
its Impoundment Control Act review authority, however, GAO has
used definitional guidelines which give broader discretion to execu-
tive deferrals than Congress may have intended. Thus in interpret-
ing the rescission language of section 1012(a), GAO has concluded
that it
does not establish that termination of a program or activity is
necessarily a rescission of the funds .... A rescission occurs
when budget authority will be unused: if a cancellation will have
that result, then a rescission should be reported and, if the Presi-
dent did not do so, we would. But if a cancellation merely results
in budget authority being used for another authorized purpose,
then no rescission occurs. 2° 1
This same analysis has also been applied to the increased use of
deferrals pending transfer requests. A program is deferred on the
basis that a request to transfer the funds to another account has
been submitted for congressional action. Again, the fact that the
198. See Impoundment Oversight Hearing, supra note 54; Deferral Defects Hearing, supra
note 57; Deferral Process Hearing, supra note 57.
199. The Senate version of impoundment control placed the burden of gaining congres-
sional approval on the President. The House version gave the President authority to im-
pound while the burden of disapproval lay with either House of Congress. The law that
emerged incorporated both themes-the Senate version in rescissions and the House version
in deferrals.
200. There have been suggestions that the terms are so imprecise as to be unworkable and
thus capture too many routine spending deferrals. See Note, supra note 36, at 693 n.2. Yet if
the statutory language is too narrowly drawn, it becomes far easier to circumvent the terms of
the law.
201. Legislative Branch Appropriations for 1987. Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Appropriations, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. pt.2 525-26 (1986).
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administration intends to rescind the program should Congress
agree is not held per se to be a rescission. 2 ' As a result of this
interpretation, GAO has reclassified very few deferral messages. 0 3
When a deferral is reclassified or an improper impoundment is re-
ported by GAO as a rescission, GAO has determined that the 45-
day clock begins running at that later date, rather than from the
point at which the funds were first impounded.
In 1975, GAO ruled that the President can withhold funds pro-
posed in a rescission message, although the clear language of section
1012(b) states the funds "shall be made available for obligation."" °
Thus the President has been able to withhold funds immediately
upon submitting either a deferral or a rescission. The key difference
between these alternative methods was the time limit imposed on
the rescission. Once Chadha was decided, the appropriations com-
mittees decided not to use one-House resolutions to disapprove de-
ferrals. Attaching disapprovals to the appropriations or
supplemental bills not only required a waiver of the House rules,205
but also meant long delays in overturning impoundment actions. °6
Additionally, Impoundment Control Act reporting require-
ments are premised on good faith compliance by the executive. Yet
OMB has terminated funds in anticipation of later reporting an im-
207poundment message. This is in clear violation of the Impound-
ment Control Act, but the GAO lacks any comprehensive
monitoring procedure other than through reports from public offi-
cials or program recipients.
With the limited discretionary authority available now to the
President, the Reagan Administration is more aggressively exploit-
ing these weaknesses in the process. Although OMB is still report-
ing deferrals, transfer requests are increasingly used as a basis for
deferrals. The National League of Cities turned again to the court
202. See Deferral Defects Hearing, supra note 57, at 108-11 (testimony of Milton J. Soco-
lar, Special Assistant to the Comptroller General, GAO).
203. Deferrals reclassified by GAO numbered 7 in 1975 and none until 1986, when one
deferral was reclassified as of March 20, 1986. Deferral Process Hearing, supra note 57, at
146. It should be noted that the administration has also reclassified deferrals. See supra note
93.
204. See supra note 54.
205. See supra note 91.
206. Before Chadha, an impoundment resolution (deferral disapproval) could be acted on
in 2-3 weeks. Using the appropriations bills after Chadha increased the time needed to halt
an impoundment to 6-8 months. See Deferral Defects Hearing, supra note 57, at 14 (state-
ment of Hon. Jamie L. Whitten, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee).
207. See Impoundment Oversight Hearing, supra note 54, at 4-20 (statement of Rep. Peter
A. Peyser (N.Y.) on OMB impoundment of funds for library services).
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seeking distribution of Revenue Sharing funds which were seques-
tered under Gramm-Rudman and transferred from the trust fund
into the general treasury.2 °8
Early in 1987, while the administration stated that it had essen-
tially abandoned requests for policy deferrals, the President on Jan-
uary 28 submitted a report for 25 policy deferrals totaling $300
million pending transfer requests.20 9 The cited authority for defer-
ral included section 1013 of the Impoundment Control Act and a
provision in the 1987 Continuing Resolution relating to the federal
pay increase.210 In February the Public Citizen Litigation Group
instituted a suit on behalf of the Mid-Ohio Food Bank and others
challenging the deferral of funds which supported emergency food
organizations.21  Although the deferral was ultimately overruled
by Congress and funding restored, the plaintiffs in Mid-Ohio re-
quested a declaratory judgment on the issue of the President's statu-
tory authority to make policy deferrals. The district court declined
to decide this issue.21 2 An April 1 GAO report to Congress con-
cluded that the deferrals were not permitted under either provision
since (1) section 1013, the exclusive statutory provision for policy de-
ferrals was invalid, and (2) neither congressional intent nor statu-
tory construction supported the argument that the pay raise
provision gave deferral authority to the President.213 The report
also noted that GAO no longer had authority to sue on behalf of
208. NLC Suit to Challenge Treasury on GRS, Nation's Cities Weekly, Feb. 16, 1987,
(vol. 10, no. 7) at 1, col. 1. Gramm-Rudman specifies that trust funds shall remain seques-
tered in the trust accounts. The present administration has justified the transfer to the gen-
eral treasury as facilitating the closing down of the Revenue Sharing program. Judge Joyce
Hens Green ruled that the revenue sharing funds should be released to the cities. National
Ass'n of Counties v. Baker, 669 F. Supp. 518 (D.D.C. 1987). See also 45 CONG. Q. WEEKLY
REP. 1766 (Aug. 1, 1987).
209. 45 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 145 (Jan. 24, 1987).
210. Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-591,
§ 144(a)(3)(A), 100 Stat. 3341-353 (1986). The language stated that appropriations for fed-
eral pay increases "shall be made based on the assumption that the various departments and
agencies of the Government will, in the aggregate, absorb 50 percent of the increase in total
pay for fiscal year 1987." Id. The administration's interpretation of this language gives the
President separate impoundment authority to selectively withhold program funds regardless
of any administrative cost savings, employee attrition or supplemental appropriation. Memo-
randum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at
15-17, Mid-Ohio Food Bank v. Lyng, 670 F. Supp. 403 (D.D.C. 1987). See also Comptroller
General Report to Congress at 6-8 (B-224882 of Apr. 1, 1987) (discussing legality of execu-
tive spending deferrals and rejecting the administration's argument).
211. Mid-Ohio Food Bank, 670 F. Supp. 403.
212. Id. at 408. See also Notice of Withdrawal of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary In-
junction, Mid-Ohio Food Bank.
213. Comptroller General Report to Congress, supra note 210.
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Congress for release of the funds once section 1013 of the Impound-
ment Control Act had been invalidated.
z14
The deletion of section 1013 which followed from the New Haven
decision has not fully resolved the deferral issue. A gap in the stat-
ute may now leave in doubt whether deferrals pursuant to statutory
authority other than the Impoundment Control Act should con-
tinue to be reported to Congress.215 The Impoundment Control
Act created statutory authority to impound funds while also provid-
ing a reporting and approval mechanism. Although statutory au-
thority other than the Impoundment Control Act is quite limited,
the lack of review could give rise to abuse of that impoundment
authority.
Congressman Bruce Morrison216 and forty-nine co-sponsors
have introduced H.R. 1181 amending the Impoundment Control Act
to provide for deferral authority on the same basis as rescissions.
Thus proposed deferrals will not be effective unless Congress acts
within 45 legislative days to approve the deferral. It is important
that Congress consider adopting a proposal along these lines.
Treating deferrals in the same manner as rescissions and placing
the burden for approval on the President no longer requires distin-
guishing between the two. It should easily simplify the review pro-
cess and remove from the discussion whether a message is properly
classified to instead decide whether the withholding is justified. Re-
porting of impoundments still rests on a good faith compliance with
the process, but the resources of both the GAO and the several
budget and appropriations committees would be better focused on
the substantive policy issues.
The evident weakness of the GAO as an enforcement agency
compels more assertive action by Congress. Although the GAO
was created by Congress to serve as its investigative arm, its Im-
poundment Control Act-role in executive-legislative impoundment
disputes also placed GAO in a difficult adjudicatory position be-
214. Section 1016 of the ICA states: "If, under section 1012(b) [rescissions] or 1013(b)
[deferrals], budget authority is required to be made available for obligation and such budget
authority is not made available" the Comptroller General may bring a civil suit.
215. Section 1013(a) states: "Whenever the President [or other government officials]...
proposes to defer any budget authority provided for a specific purpose or project" the Con-
gress should be notified. Since this notice provision applies to deferral of any budget author-
ity, it may now mean that Congress is not required to be notified of deferrals under the Anti-
Deficiency Act. Not having to report deferral actions makes Congress' oversight of the im-
poundment process more difficult.
216. Rep. Bruce Morrison (Conn.) was one of the congressional plaintiffs in the success-
ful New Haven litigation. He introduced this same bill in 1986.
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tween the branches. GAO's reluctance to precipitate a crisis with
the executive may explain its predominant support of the adminis-
tration's interpretation of the statute. Treating deferrals as recis-
sions and restoring the Comptroller General's authority to sue for
any unauthorized withholding strengthens the review and enforce-
ment provision of the Impoundment Control Act. Using the same
timetable and approval mechanism should also eliminate thc need
for such creative devices as a "deferral pending transfer request" as
well as assure continued funding should Congress disapprove the
deferral request.
The Impoundment Control Act should also be amended to state
clearly that it is the exclusive statutory authority for policy im-
poundments, whether a deferral or rescission. The New Haven
court and GAO have adopted this position; the statute should be
explicit on this point. The notice provision for all deferrals should
be clearly incorporated in the bill so that all proposed deferrals and
rescissions are reported to Congress.
Given the constraints of Chadha, there is no other legislative
mechanism which will serve the congressional interest in retaining
control over executive spending. Whether the Congress chooses to
act is a political question. If it does, then a strong consensus is
required, probably a supermajority to override an expected presi-
dential veto. There is a growing crisis on this issue, although it has
not yet reached the pitch of the Nixon period which precipitated the
Budget and Impoundment Control Act. The administration is talk-
ing compromise while it is also taking steps to circumvent congres-
sional authority. The Chadha Court took away a creative
legislative tool which allowed for flexibility in sharing power. New
Haven has reasserted congressional prerogatives in spending power.
It is now up to Congress to act to preserve that power.
LORETTA HAGOPIAN GARRISON
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